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ABSTRACT. This paper models theocracy as a regime where the clergy in 
power retains knowledge of the cost of political production but which is potentially 
incompetent or corrupt. This is contrasted with a secular regime where government is 
contracted out to a secular ruler, and hence the church loses the possibility to observe 
costs and creates for itself a hidden-information agency problem. The church is free to 
choose between regimes – a make-or-buy choice – and we look for the range of 
environmental parameters that are most conducive to the superiority of theocracy and 
therefore to its occurrence and persistence, despite its disabilities. Numerical solution of 
the model indicates that the optimal environment for a theocracy is likely to be one in 
which the “bad” (high-cost) state is disastrously bad but the probability of its occurrence 
is not very high. A broad review of the historical evidence yields some suggestive 
support to the predictions of the model. Finally, the model is shown to be applicable to 
the make-or-buy-government choices of other groups, such as organized labor and the 
military.
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”Our lawgiver, however, was attracted by none of these forms of polity, but gave to his 
constitution the form of what (….) may be termed a ‘theocracy’, placing all sovereignty 
and authority in the hands of God.” Hence, “there should be nothing astonishing in our 
facing death on behalf of our laws with a courage no other nation can equal.” 





As Josephus’s opening quote unambiguously states for ancient Israel, theocracy 
literally means government by God. Since, however, God is not known to have ruled 
worldly government directly, the word is usually understood to mean government by a 
clergy, or a self-appointed group who claim to speak and act on God’s behalf. This will 
be our understanding of the term in this paper: a political arrangement by which the 
main functions of secular government are discharged by a priesthood who double as 
secular officials. It bears noting that theocracy in this strict sense is by no means 
coterminous with overarching power of a church or religion; to take a current example, 
Saudi Arabia, which is ruled by a lay royalty, is arguably more tightly dominated by 
religion in everyday life than Iran, which is ostensibly ruled by clerics. 
Whether or not they maximize the religious intensity of a society, theocracies in 
history are noted for their rarity but also, when they do come into being, for their 
remarkable permanence. This is one of the very few safe generalizations one can make 
about historical theocracies; otherwise they can be warlike and aggressive as well as 
peaceful and benign, revolutionary as well as conservative, self-enclosed and defensive 
as well as expansionary and proselytizing, run by a hierarchical clergy as well as by an 
egalitarian community of “saints” or a charismatic leader. A non-exhaustive catalog of 
prominent examples is sufficient to illustrate all these varieties and combinations 
thereof: the Israelite theocracy after the return from the Babylonian exile (the first for 
which we have a written record)1, the crusaders’ kingdoms in Palestine, the Papal state 
in Italy from the eight century to 1870, the Jesuits’ mission system in Paraguay, 
Savonarola’s brief rule in Florence, Calvin’s rule in Geneva, the Anabaptist kingdom of 
Muenster, the Mormon state of Utah, the Muslim caliphates, the contemporary 
ayatollahs’ Iran, Afghanistan under the Taleban, the Mahdi state of Sudan in the 1880s, 
the Buddhist regimes of traditional Tibet and Mongolia. 
                                               
1
 Earlier examples may arguably be found in the temple cities of ancient Mesopotamia and perhaps other 
ancient societies, but our knowledge of them relies only on the archaeological record. 
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Over the long haul of history this is a very small crop, but nearly all of these 
instances were long-lasting and were in most cases terminated only by outside force. 
This stylized fact speaks for the existence of particular environments which are fairly 
uncommon but, if and when they do occur, are singularly conducive to the birth and 
persistence of this type of political regime. 
The foregoing list also highlights a perplexing feature of historical theocracies: 
only some religions, not all, seem to be given to theocratic experiments under 
appropriate circumstances. These are the main branches of Islam, several varieties of 
Protestantism, and Buddhism. The Catholic church’s contribution to the crop is 
exceptional and that of Orthodox Christianity entirely absent. Other non-European 
religions do not feature at all in the list. There is no ready explanation for this 
differential propensity to theocracy, but a prior understanding of the appropriate 
environment for a theocracy will help us toward making sense of these propensities as 
well. 
This paper addresses the question of the appropriate environment for theocracy 
by treating theocratic government as an option that a religious organization or 
movement – here called a church for convenience – can purposely choose, the 
alternative option being the contracting out of the business of government to an outside 
party. The choice of theocracy versus secular government is here viewed as a make-or-
buy choice: whether to “produce” government in-house or to outsource it under a proper 
procurement contract. Needless to say, the kind of government the church wants in 
either case is not likely to be just like any ordinary public administration: it will focus 
on the upholding and servicing of the ways of life that the church views as its mission to 
enforce on, or elicit from, the lay society. Hence, failure of delivery on a procurement 
contract will typically not mean delaying the release of passports to citizens, say, but 
allowing the heathens to defile a holy place.  
The sequence of models that follow feature a “church” and a “ruler” as the 
principal and agent, respectively, of agency theory. In one model the ruler is a 
clergyman, in the other an outside contractor. The contract between church and cleric 
differs from the contract between church and outsider in that the latter contract must 
confront a problem of private information about costs whereas the former need not. Our 
approach departs from standard asymmetric information theory in that it views the 
alternative between in-house and outside production, or full-information vs hidden-
information contracts, not as a feature of the world but as a choice that the church (the 
principal) is free to make.  
Why would a principal ever choose a second-best, hidden-information 
arrangement if he can avail himself of a first-best, full-information arrangement? 
 4
Because the full-information regime, which relies on insiders to the church (clerics), has 
inherent disabilities. These may be of two kinds. The first possibility is incompetence: 
clerics have made an investment in clerical skills to the detriment of other, 
administrative or political skills. The basic principles of division of labor and 
specialization speak against professional clerics doubling as secular officials. If this 
skill gap is relevant the church may be willing to relax control in exchange for better 
governing abilities. The second possibility is corruption: if the church’s control over its 
clergy is weak, the latter may take advantage of it and pursue a private agenda. Thus in 
some cases the church may want to artificially create an agency problem with an outside 
agent for the purpose of putting a brake on inside corruption. In this sense, our approach 
is analogous to the approach to enterprise privatization by Shapiro and Willig (1990), 
which sees privatization and its attending agency problem as a check on the private, 
self-serving agenda of a public official in charge of a public enterprise. Turning from 
priestly rule to contracted-out, secular government is, in a deep sense, tantamount to 
“privatizing” a theocracy.  
Principal-agent models are in a sense reduced-form models which feature only 
two parties to a contract; the third party – here, the population or society at large – is left 
in the background. This may puzzle the reader. Is the population indifferent as between 
regimes? And what if the people think that the religion itself is wicked, its leadership 
totally corrupt, so that they want no theocracy nor church-controlled government at all? 
Furthermore, assigning the church the role of principal and the ruler that of agent may 
be puzzling too: why not the other way round? 
The best way to understand our approach is to focus on a society in which there 
is one dominant religion, and other religions either do not exist or are clearly a minority; 
the larger this minority, or the more the society is split along religious cleavages, the 
higher the probability that the outside ruler may listen to the minority and turn out to be 
“bad” from the church’s point of view. Within the dominant religion, by definition, 
people are willing members of it and have no quarrels with the church leadership, so 
that the latter is popularly legitimated and empowered to either directly run the 
government or hire a ruler on the people’s behalf; for if people thought that the church 
leaders themselves are fundamentally corrupt they would not really be willing members 
and the church would not be powerful enough to be the principal to a government 
contract. In such a one-religion society, or subset of society, were it not for other 
factors, people would always want to live under a theocracy – provided it is their brand 
of theocracy. This is because clergymen have already made a sunk investment in a 
clerical career and therefore are more trustworthy as government officials than any lay 
person: other things equal, the penalty for misbehavior is higher for clerics than for 
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nonclerics. From this point of view, somewhat paradoxically, the right question to ask is 
not why there exist theocracies at all, but why there are so few of them: why are one-
religion societies not all theocracies? Our answer to this question will revolve around 
the disabilities of theocratic government mentioned above.  
Finally, a church can be the principal and make the contract choice only if it is 
the dominant power in a society, which implies that secular powers or monarchs are for 
some reason distant, vacant, weak, or uninterested; the list of theocracies given above, 
which will be surveyed in section 7 below, shares in fact this feature, either because of 
the accidents of empire or colonization or the incidents of revolution. On the other hand, 
it must be the case that such gaps in the web of secular power do occur somewhere, 
sometime; we would never observe a theocracy if the world were at all times 
completely partitioned into strong, established secular states. As the model to be 
developed below will show, we should never observe a theocracy when the probability 
of a “bad state” – an unfriendly ruler – is very high; in such a case the church will be 
wise to take cover and buy protection from the ruler. Thus, both the attitude of society 
and the church’s power as a principal are captured by the environmental parameters that 
bound the regime choice in the models to follow. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the economic 
environment and the basic choice setting. Sections 3 and 4 characterize the full-
information contract, or theocracy, and the hidden-information contract, or secular 
government, respectively. Section 5 models the church’s choice of contract as a 
function of environmental parameters, and section 6 resorts to numerical calculation to 
establish the main theoretical result of the paper. Section 7 surveys the historical 
evidence and finds that our theoretical findings account well for the religions’ 
differential propensity to theocracy, for the occurrence and persistence of both 
conservative and revolutionary theocracies, and for the special Islamic mix of regimes. 
Section 8 suggests that the model can be extended beyond religion to encompass the 
make-or-buy choices of regimes by other groups, such as organized labor and the 
military. Section 9 concludes. 
 
 
2. The economic environment 
 
Suppose that the church’s gross benefits from secular government, b, depend 
only on the ruler’s effort, e, through a deterministic function b(e), with b(0) =0, b’ >0, 
and b” ≤0. The church maximizes expected net benefits, i.e. gross benefits minus wages 
paid to the ruler. The ruler’s effort level is fully observable by the church; however, the 
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ruler’s disutility from effort is influenced by a random factor θ, whose realization is 
observed by the church only if the ruler himself is a cleric, i.e. if government is 
managed directly by the church. We call this arrangement a theocracy. By contrast, if 
the business of government is contracted out to a lay ruler, only the latter, not the 
church, observes the state of nature θ. We call this arrangement a secular regime, 
though controlled by the church. The church is free to choose which regime to 
implement, that is, whether to run the government in-house as a theocracy or to make a 
deal with an outsider to get the job done. In either case, the ruler, whether lay or 
clerical, has to be motivated to accept the contract, hence the church’s maximization 
problem is subject to a participation constraint. In addition, under the secular regime, an 
incentive-compatibility constraint arises which further bounds the church’s choice of 
contract. 
Since the church’s choice of regime is in effect a choice between a full-
information and a hidden-information arrangement, it is trivial to show that, other things 
equal, the former is always strictly superior to the latter. This basic insight from 
principal-agent theory captures the idea that a theocracy has a uniquely valuable asset: if 
the public official is a cleric, he has already posted a bond with the church, as it were, a 
bond whose value will be lost if he is caught shirking on his duties and fired; hence 
from the people’s point of view a cleric is more trustworthy than a lay official. 
However, there are countervailing factors: incompetence and corruption, which might 
worsen the performance of clerical rule. If the clerics’ skills at government jobs are 
inferior to those of a lay ruler – which they must be because of their specialization in 
clerical work – then other things are not equal and the church may after all prefer 
contracting out. Furthermore, if the church’s control over its own personnel is weak 
enough that their self-serving activities are bad enough, then the theocracy may after all 
turn out to be inferior to the secular regime. In other words, the church may want to 
purposely create a hidden-information agency problem with an outside contractor, 
where none need exist, in order to hold its own corruption in check. Our model is 
compatible with both interpretations, even though we will often use the corruption 
interpretation for ease of exposition. Our central concern will be to establish under what 
environments one regime becomes preferable to the other from the church’s point of 
view. 
Under either regime, the ruler is a risk-neutral expected utility maximizer. His 
utility from wages, w, and effort, e, depends on the state of nature θ. We use an 
additively separable utility function of the form: 
 
( ) ( )θθ ,,, ecwewU −=                                                                 (1) 
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In words, the ruler’s cost of effort is increasing and strictly convex in the effort 
level. Higher values of θ denote more productive states of nature in the sense that both 
total and marginal cost of effort are lower when θ is higher. For simplicity, we assume 
that θ can take on only one of two values, θH > θL, with Prob (θH) = P. The ruler has a 
reservation utility level U°. In addition, in any state of nature, when he is a clergyman, 
the ruler can secure private benefits to the amount K (or, his effort cost is higher – his 
productivity lower – by the amount K): the church must take this into account when 
designing a contract that satisfies the participation constraint. 
In this setup, under any regime, effort itself is always observable, so the contract 
can explicitly state the effort level required. However, an efficient contract that 
maximizes the principal’s payoff must make the level of effort responsive to the cost 





As explained above, a theocracy makes the state of nature observable by the 
church but is liable to be incompetent or corrupt. Thus, a complete information contract 
directly specifies effort level and wage contingent on each realization of θ
 
and ensures 
the cleric an expected utility that is no lower than his reservation utility plus his private 
benefits from corruption (or his additional effort cost). With only two states of nature, 
the church solves the following problem: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
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At the optimal solution, the participation constraint must bind. Note that the 
degree of corruption, or the extra cost, K, is analytically equivalent to an increase in the 
agent’s reservation utility. Risk neutrality implies that wages and utilities in each state 
are indeterminate at the optimum, but this does not matter as long as the agent’s 
expected utility satisfies the constraint. Denoting by e*H, e*L the solutions to this 
problem, for strictly positive effort levels, the first-order conditions for an interior 
solution yield: 
 ( ) ( )HHeH eceb θ,∗∗ =′                                         (4a) ( ) ( )LLeL eceb θ,∗∗ =′     (4b) 
 
Thus, predictably, the optimal level of effort in each state equates its marginal 
benefit with its marginal cost. 
 
 
4. Secular government 
 
Under this regime, only the ruler knows the true state of nature, so he may lie to 
the church and claim that it is θL when it is in fact θH, thereby lowering the church’s net 
benefits; therefore the full-information contract described above is unfeasible.  
To characterize an optimal contract in this setting, we rely on the revelation 
principle (Myerson, 1979; Baron and Myerson, 1982). By this principle, the principal 
can never do better than implementing a contract which requires the agent to announce 
which state has occurred, specifies an outcome (w, e) for each possible announcement 
of θ,
 
and makes it optimal for the agent always to report the state truthfully. Thus an 
incentive-compatibility, or truth-telling, constraint is added on to the principal’s 
contract design problem. 
Of course, since only the ruler observes the state, if he is to accept the contract 
he must be guaranteed a utility of at least U° in each state. Given the revelation 
principle, the contract specifies two pairs of values, (wH, eH) and (wL, eL), which are the 
outcomes (wage and effort levels) that are assigned to different announcements of the 
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The first two constraints are the participation constraints for each state, as 
described above. The last two are the incentive-compatibility or truth-telling constraints 
for each state. For example, constraint (iii) says that when state θH obtains, the agent’s 
utility if he reports the truth is no lower than if he claims that state θL has occurred 
instead. Constraint (iv) is interpreted similarly. 
The solution to this problem is developed in the Appendix. There it is shown that 
only constraints (i) and (iii) bind in the optimal contract. This immediately implies that 
constraint (ii) holds as a strict inequality: thus the agent receives just his reservation 
utility in the bad state whereas he earns a surplus in the good state. Furthermore, 
denoting by êL, êH the solutions to this problem, optimal effort levels are given by the 
following equations: 
 
( ) ( )HHeH eceb θ,ˆˆ =′       (6a) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 0,ˆ,ˆ,ˆˆ1 =−+−′− LLeHLeLLeL ececPecebP θθθ         (6b) 
 
Equation (6a) is identical to (4a). In equation (6b), the second bracketed 
expression is negative (recall (2)), hence the first bracketed expression must be positive 
to satisfy the equation. Therefore, êH = e*H and êL < e*L. The optimal contract sets the 
level of effort in state θH at its full-information level e*H, whereas in state θL it sets 
effort strictly below its first-best level e*L. As a consequence, the church’s expected net 
benefits are strictly lower than those it receives (absent incompetence or corruption) 
when θ is observable. It is worth noting that here the church has two sources of losses in 
comparison with the full-information contract: one is a deadweight loss (an inefficiently 
low effort level in state θL), the other is a transfer to the ruler (a surplus wage for the 
same, efficient effort level in state θH). The relative weight of each type of loss depends 
on the relative probabilities of the two states. 
The intuition for these results is that the ruler’s private information about θ
 
is an 
asset that is valuable to the church; if the ruler is to release his control of this asset (i.e. 
report the truth) he must be paid what is in effect a monopoly rent. This takes the form 
of making it in the ruler’s best interest to report θH when it occurs by allowing him a 
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surplus, whereas reporting θL earns him no surplus. (Recall that were it not for this 
incentive, he would be tempted to report θL when θH occurs.) This is costly to the 
church, the more so the higher is P, the probability of the good state. By combining 
constraints (i) and (iii) as equalities, it is easy to check that the agent’s surplus utility in 
state θH is equal to c(eL, θL) – c(eL, θH), the cost difference between states for the same 
level of effort; were he not paid this rent, the ruler would again report θL when θH 
occurs. Now this difference shrinks as e falls (recall from (2) that it vanishes as e goes 
to zero). Therefore when the probability of θH is high, the church will be driven to lower 
eL even more, thereby losing benefits from state θL (whose probability is low anyway), 
in order to reduce its losses from the rents paid out in state θH. Differentiation of 
equation (6b) confirms that the optimal êL falls as P rises (see the Appendix). Figure 1 
illustrates the optimal hidden-information contract in the w-e space. 
 
  (Figure 1 about here) 
 
Here the upward-sloping, convex curves are the indifference curves for each 
state corresponding to the reservation utility, while the increasing concave curves are 
iso-benefit curves. When the state is observable the solution is at the tangency points 
e*H and e*L (equations (4a) and (4b)). When the state is not observable the solution for 
state θH is still at a tangency point for the same level of effort (equation (6a)), but for a 
higher wage. This surplus wage insures that the agent does not lie when state θH occurs 
by giving him the same utility as in state θL (constraint iii): hence the tangency point 
occurs with a θH indifference curve which is above reservation utility and passes 
through the (w, e) pair that obtains in state θL. If this pair were the efficient one as under 
full observability, the surplus would be too high, so effort falls below e*L to êL in order 
to relax the truth-telling constraint and reduce the surplus wage at e*H (equation (6b)). 
The surplus is therefore measured by the vertical distance between the two relevant 
indifference curves for state θH, i.e. by the cost difference between states at êL. 
An implication of this analysis underlines a key difference between the two 
regimes. Under the full-information regime (theocracy), optimal effort levels do not 
depend on the probabilities of the two states (although of course the church’s total 
expected benefits do). In the hidden information contract, by contrast, optimal effort 
level in state θL does depend on the probabilities (equation (6b)). Keeping this in mind, 
we can proceed to consider the choice of regimes. 
 
 
5. Choosing between regimes 
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The church will naturally choose the arrangement that yields the largest expected 
net benefits. By substituting the constraint into expected benefits when θ is observable, 
EBO (equation (3)), and substituting constraints (i) and (iii) into expected benefits when 
θ is not observable, EBN (equation (5)), and simplifying, we find that EBO – EBN ≥0 if 
and only if 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 0,ˆ,ˆ,ˆˆ,1 ≥−−+−−−− ∗∗ KececPecebecebP HLLLLLLLLL θθθθ (7) 
 
If this condition holds, theocracy is superior to secular government. It will be 
noticed that although the outcome in state θH is part of total benefits under each regime, 
it drops out from (7) since in both regimes e*H is efficient and independent of 
probabilities. The first bracketed expression on the LHS is the net benefit difference 
between regimes in state θL and is positive because e*L is efficient whereas êL is not, 
and the second expression is also positive as it measures the surplus wage at e*H. 
Therefore condition (7) would always be satisfied with strict inequality if K were equal 
to zero: absent incompetence and corruption, a first-best contract is trivially superior to 
a second-best one. Clearly, though, incompetence or corruption can be serious enough 
to overturn the inequality and make secular government superior to theocracy. 
However, for any given level of K, the LHS of (7) is a function of two 
parameters: the probabilities of the two states and the distance between them, that is, 
how bad the bad state is and how likely it is to occur. There will be configurations of 
these parameters that make theocracy more resilient, or more profitable, despite 
incompetence or corruption: these environments will be the most favorable to the 
occurrence and persistence of theocracy. To find out what these look like, we treat P 
and θL (given θH) as variables and ask how the difference in expected net benefits 
between regimes, EBO – EBN (i.e. the LHS of (7)), changes as those variables change. 
The difficulty lies in the fact that, as condition (7) shows, there are two sources of loss 
to the church under the secular regime, a transfer to the ruler at θH and an efficiency loss 
at θL, and the two vary inversely with each other: reducing the transfer involves 
increasing the efficiency loss and viceversa. 
For analytical purposes, we treat the LHS of (7) – itself a maximum value 
function in e*L and êL – as an objective function and proceed to maximize it with 
respect to P and θL: the combination of parameters that solves this problem, if it should 
happen to be realized, is where the comparative advantage of theocracy is at its best. 
Making use of the first-order conditions of the previous two problems throughout (i.e. 
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making sure that all contracts are optimal at all parameter values), the FOC for a 
maximum of EBO – EBN (the LHS of (7)) are: 






EBEB θθθθ  







                             (8b) 
 
These equations define the values (P, θL) that maximize the comparative 
advantage of theocracy (second-order conditions are given in the Appendix). Each of 
them is simply the difference between the derivatives of EBO and EBN with respect to P 
and θL, respectively; again in equation (8a) the expression for e*H drops out as it 
appears identical on both sides of the difference. The first bracket in (8a) is the loss of 
net benefits in the theocracy as P increases, which is constant as e*L is independent of P. 
The last two brackets measure the net benefits at θL plus the surplus wage paid out at θH 
under the secular regime, which both decrease as P increases (see (6b)). When P is 
small these two brackets are large and make the derivative positive, and conversely 
when P is high. When (8a) holds, P is such that these losses to the two regimes exactly 
balance out. Analogously, equation (8b) says that the theocracy’s gain in cost reduction 
from an increase of θL when state θL occurs, i.e. (1-P) times θc  (first term), exactly 
balances the secular regime’s similar gain in all states, because here the cost reduction 
affects also the surplus wage at θH (second term). 
To gain a better insight into the problem, let us look at the changes in EBO and 
EBN separately as P and θL change (see the Appendix). EBO increases linearly in P (see 
equ. (3)). EBN is first decreasing then increasing in P, reaching an interior minimum. 
For a given θL, there will be a maximum difference EBO – EBN at a value P  where (8a) 
is satisfied. On the other hand, EBO and EBN are both increasing and convex in θL, but 
EBO increases faster (more slowly) than EBN when P is lower (higher) than the value 
defined by (8b), at which the two rates of increase are exactly equal and the difference 
EBO – EBN is at a maximum. Call this critical value P*. An example is shown in Figure 
2, which depicts EBO and EBN as functions of P. An increase in θL results in upward 
shifts of these curves. P  is the optimal P that satisfies (8a) at the initial level of θL. P* 
is the level at which LNLO EBEB θθ ∂∂=∂∂ , satisfying (8b). Clearly, as P* is below 
P , the rise in θL increases EBO by less than it increases EBN, making the benefit 
difference fall. The figure also suggests that an infinitesimal change in θL would not 
change EBO – EBN if P*= P , which is the full optimum satisfying (8a) and (8b) 
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simultaneously. Finally, an increase in K, the level of corruption, would be simply 
captured by a parallel downward shift of EBO in the figure, squeezing the range of P 
values where theocracy remains superior to the secular regime. 
 
  (Figure 2 about here) 
 
Characterizing the full optimum (8a) and (8b) in the P – θL space must account 
for the fact that both P  and P*, defined by (8a) and (8b) respectively, are functions of 
θL. These functions are implicitly defined by equations (8a) and (8b); by implicit 
differentiation (given in the Appendix) we can calculate their slopes. It turns out that P  
and P* can either be both monotonically decreasing or both monotonically increasing in 
θL, and that in either case, in the neighborhood of the optimum where the two curves 
cross, ( )LP θ∗  must be steeper than ( )LP θ . The decreasing case obtains when a change 
in θL has a greater effect on the total cost of effort than on the marginal cost of effort, 
while the increasing case obtains when the reverse is true – we can find no compelling 
reason for either assumption.  
All this is not saying much, however, unless we can more precisely locate the 
theocratic optimum in the parameter space. Unfortunately, in general, there is no way of 
telling in what region of the P – θL space the theocratic optimum T may lie, let alone 
whether it is unique; indeed, it is not even clear whether it may be an interior or a corner 
solution. The fact that with respect to the probability range the optimal P  lies to the 
right of the minimum of EBN, which is in turn an interior point (see Figure 2), strongly 
suggests that for a given θL this optimal probability cannot be too close to the lower end 
of the range. With respect to the low-productivity state θL, it is unlikely that its optimal 
value be too close to the upper end of its range, where (for θL close to θH) the two 
regimes become virtually indistinguishable. But beyond that, to gain some insight into 
the location of the optimum we must resort to specific functions and numerical 
calculation, to which we now turn. 
 
 
6. Some numerical examples 
 
In keeping with the assumptions of our general model, let us pick a standard 
gross benefit function which is strictly concave in the level of effort: 
 
( ) 0  with             >= αα eeb     (9) 
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and a simple cost function which is strictly convex in the effort: 






ec       (10) 
 
The latter satisfies all of the requirements for the cost function (2) above2. For 
the moment, set α =2 in (9). Define θH =1 as the upper bound of θL and zero as its lower 
bound. We thus have a 1x1 space. 
With these functions, the complete optimization system simultaneously 
determines (e*L, êL, θL, P) in such a way that contracts of each type are optimal 
throughout and parameter values yield a maximum of theocratic advantage (7). We can 
thus write down the specific counterparts of equations (4b), (6b), (8a), (8b), which after 
slight manipulation turn out to be as follows: 
 

























































   (8a’) 
( ) 0ˆ1 22 =−− ∗ LL eeP       (8b’) 
 
First, ignore the last equation. The first three can be numerically solved for e*L, 
êL, and P  for given values of θL. This exercise yields a slowly increasing, convex ( )LP θ  curve, which starts at P =0.66 for θL =0, rises to 0.68 for θL =0.25, to 0.72 for θL 
=0.5, to 0.78 for θL =0.75, to 0.85 for θL =0.9, and ends up at P =1 for θL =1. Now take 
the starting point of this curve, where at θL =0 we have e*L =1, êL =0.64, P  =0.66, and 
plug these numbers into (8b’): this expression turns out negative. Hence a further fall of 
θL below zero would still increase EBO – EBN. In other words, the function ( )LP θ∗  that 
satisfies (8b’) lies outside and to the left of the square box that bounds our parameter 
values. Therefore we have a corner solution at θL =0, P =0.66. Figure 3 depicts the 
solution with some indifference curves. The reader can readily check that the partial-
equilibrium example of Figure 2 fits neatly in this P – θL space. 
 
   (Figure 3 about here) 
 
                                               
2 We also tried out a logarithmic benefit function, as well as some variations on the cost function. None of 
our results were materially affected. 
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If we go back to function (9) and change the scale parameter α, our results are 
unaffected: effort levels are scaled up or down but the ( )LP θ  curve shifts only 
minimally and the corner solution remains. This is what one would expect as a 
parametric shift of the benefit (or of the cost) function that affects both regimes leaves 
the comparative advantage unchanged. 
Interestingly, an interior solution obtains when only costs are strictly convex but 
benefits are linear – which is still compatible with problems (3) and (5). If we replace 
equation (9) with b(e) = e, keep function (10) unchanged, and rework the calculations, 
we find a ( )LP θ  curve, satisfying the linear counterpart of (8a’), which is almost 
unchanged: it starts at P =0.59 for θL =0, is slowly increasing and convex, and ends at P 
=1 for θL =1. Furthermore, however, taking the linear counterparts of (4b’), (6b’), (8b’) 
and solving numerically for e*L, êL, and θL for given values of P, we now find a steeply 
increasing, concave ( )LP θ∗  curve which lies fully inside the parameter space. It starts 
at θL =0 for P =0, then rises to θL =0.07 for P =0.25, to θL =0.17 for P =0.5, to θL =0.33 
for P =0.75, to θL =0.52 for P =0.9, and ends at θL =1 for P =1. The full theocratic 
optimum T is at the crossing of the two curves in Figure 4, at P =0.61 and θL =0.28. So 
the optimal θL is now positive but relatively low. 
 
   (Figure 4 about here) 
 
This exercise cannot of course lay any claim to generality. However, the specific 
functions that we have used do not seem special or biased in any way. While it may be 
possible to find plausible cost functions that behave differently in some respects – for 
example, yielding decreasing ( )LP θ  and ( )LP θ∗  curves, which is a possibility left open 
by the theoretical model of the previous section – the results here found seem robust and 
consistent enough to be taken seriously and deserve comment. 
The first finding that deserves stressing is that under all specifications the ( )LP θ  
curve starts high, well above the midpoint of the probability range, and then remains 
almost flat as θL rises until it starts picking up near the end and converges to the (1, 1) 
corner. This implies that for the greatest part of the range of θL values, the optimal 
probability P  is nearly constant at a value between 2/3 and 3/4. Theocracy is at its best 
when the good state is substantially more likely to occur than the bad state.  
The second finding that deserves emphasis is the corner solution at θL =0: 
theocracy is at its best when the bad state, even though not very likely to occur, is really 
bad when it does occur. The interior solution that obtains in the limit case of constant 
marginal benefits is due to the fact that in this case, e*L must fall by more than in the 
decreasing returns case to keep equality with marginal cost in the theocracy as θL falls 
 16
(see equation (4b)), so that too large a fall reduces its advantage. But even so the 
optimal θL is low, around ¼. So in what follows we will concentrate the discussion on 
the decreasing returns case of Figure 3. 
This is the main theoretical result of this paper: the optimal environment for a 
theocracy is one which is very bad on one dimension but fairly good on the other. Taken 
jointly, these two findings are counterintuitive, but on reflection they fit neatly into the 
logic of our model. Loosely speaking, theocracy is at its best when secular government 
is at its worst. In the latter regime, we know that the church has two sources of losses 
compared to a theocracy: an inefficiently low output in the bad state and a transfer to 
the ruler in the good state. We also know that the two are related in that the output loss 
in the bad state is purposely incurred in order to reduce the transfer. Now when the good 
state is very frequent (very high P) transfers are large but the overall weight of the 
output distortion in the bad state, which is aimed at mitigating them, is low in the 
church’s expected net benefits since this state occurs so infrequently. On the other hand, 
when the bad state is moderately to very frequent (middle to low P) transfers are small 
so the distortion need not be very large, although it occurs fairly frequently. But for high 
enough values of P, transfers are substantial as the good state occurs fairly frequently, 
and output distortions weigh heavily in expected benefits as they are both not 
insubstantial and occur frequently enough. So a critical value of P around 2/3 
compounds and exacerbates both weaknesses of the secular regime. 
On the other hand, we have seen that the difference in performance between 
regimes hinges entirely on the bad state: the worse this is (the larger the gap between θL 
and θH), the greater the inefficiency of the secular regime. It can be demonstrated (see 
the Appendix) that a change in θL has always a larger impact on êL than on e*L. 
Therefore for any given level of P, a fall in θL monotonically widens the effort gap 
between regimes and hence the output loss in the secular regime, so that this loss is 
maximized at θL =0. 
 
 
7. A look at the historical evidence 
 
The foregoing model directs us to look for theocracies in situations in which the 
bad state is not very likely but, when it does occur, is very bad – indeed the worst 
possible for the church. The first question then is, what would the worst state of affairs 
be for a religion? One obvious answer immediately comes to mind: the prospect of 
termination of the religion itself. There is a real possibility that the next ruler might 
decide to make an about-turn and start disestablishing the church and suppressing and 
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persecuting its practices. Then the church will be wise to fend off the threat by 
becoming a government unto itself. This terminal threat, however, must not be too 
likely, for if it is very likely it becomes more practical and less expensive for the church 
to “buy protection”, ie to scale down its requests and expectations somewhat and 
compensate the ruler for behaving himself. 
 
Propensity to theocracy 
The answer just given, however, begs a further question: what does “termination 
of the religion” exactly mean? The answer to this further question hinges critically on 
he type of religion, and more accurately, on whether the religion is mainly behavior-
based or doctrine-based. A behavior-based religion asks relatively little of the believer 
in terms of profession of faith and focuses mostly on the person’s publicly observable, 
outward behavior in everyday life: this group includes Islam, Judaism and 
Protestantism. By contrast, a doctrine-based religion demands orthodoxy of belief and, 
since theological subtleties in the believer’s mind cannot possibly be monitored, it 
focuses on practice and ritual inside the church and has very little in the way of 
behavioral restrictions: both Catholic and Orthodox Christianity belong here. Elsewhere 
(Ferrero 2006a, 2007) I elaborated this distinction in detail and showed how it 
differentially affects the propensity to, and the form taken by, religious extremism or 
fundamentalism. Here we must only note that a heathen ruler intent on suppressing the 
religion faces a very different task in the two cases.  
Suppressing a behavior-based religion is relatively easy, because it has to deal 
with public behavior. Kings beholden to heathen cults introduced the worship of foreign 
gods and encouraged the marriage of foreign women in the land of Israel. In the 
territory of Utah a heathen ruler (ie the United States) would at once outlaw polygamy 
and legalize saloons and brothels. A religiously lax sultan would permit the unveiling of 
women and the operation of non-shari’a courts of law. A lay Tibetan prince might 
weaken or break the ordinary people’s dependence on the Buddhist monasteries for all 
their needs. These things are not desirable implications of the religion: they are the 
religion. This accounts for the vast majority of cases in the theocracies’ list. 
By contrast, suppressing Catholic or Orthodox churches would literally require 
burning down the churches and prohibiting the rituals, which would drive them 
underground as in the glory days of early Christianity: something that not even the 
Roman emperors at the height of their persecutions ever seriously attempted to achieve 
(see Ferrero, 2006b). In other words, being focused on practices behind closed doors, 
these religions can survive in a hostile environment in a way that those of the first group 
cannot. Ulemas don’t marry people, the state does: hence a marriage is not a good 
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Muslim marriage if the state is not a proper Caliphate. By contrast, Catholic marriages 
have to be performed by ordained priests, irrespective of whether the state recognizes 
them as legally valid. Hence, Catholic theocracies are confined to peculiar, exceptional 
circumstances: the very heartland of the religion (the Papal states), the protection of 
native converts in Paraguay against enslavement by the nearby Portuguese raiders, or 
warring colonial kingdoms whose raison d’etre was the defense of the holy places in 
Palestine and which were therefore run by orders that were religious and military at the 
same time. Finally, being acephalous and non-missionary, at least after the early days, 
the Orthodox churches never found themselves in any such predicaments. 
A glance at other religions that never turned theocratic provides tentative support 
to our approach. For example, consider another major world religion which deeply 
permeated its society: Hinduism. Here the caste system enforced a division of labor 
which was not negotiable and could never be altered. As a consequence, the option of 
Brahmins turning warriors (rulers) could never be an issue and the choice problem that 
lies at the heart of our model never arose. On the other hand, the same system 
guaranteed institutionalized protection of the religion, so that the main motive for 
resorting to theocracy was lacking in the first place – at least as long as the ruler was 
himself a Hindu bound by the caste system rules. So, for better or worse, traditional 
India was spared the option of theocracy. 
 
Benign theocracies 
Thus, identifying a threat to the very survival of the religion as a prime motive 
for the rise of a theocracy provides an explanation for the differential occurrence of 
theocracies in different religions. We now turn to a bird-eye review of historical 
instances of “benign”, or conservative, theocracies to show that they nicely fit our 
model’s predictions. 
The history of the two kingdoms (Shanks, 1999) which comprised the land of 
Israel between the death of king Solomon and the Babylonian exile is dotted by kings 
who lapsed back into multiple religious allegiances and sparked the outcry of a string of 
prophets from Amos to Jeremiah, followed in each case by a “reforming” king who 
promoted the religion of Yahweh back to the leading position. Overall, this four-
centuries-odd period was one in which Yahweh was Number One, not the Only One 
(Lane Fox, 1992). The lesson was not lost to the Yahwist minority in exile who 
subsequently returned to Judea to reclaim their homeland and rebuild the Temple under 
Persian protection: from the return to the onset of Roman rule Israel was a theocracy 
where there was no secular authority above or beside the High Priest and Yahweh was 
at last the Only One. Those were relatively quiet times as long as the Persian empire, 
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and then the Greek successors to Alexander, kept a distant oversight and let the Jews 
alone to go about their own affairs. The threat did materialize on one occasion, 
however, when in the 160’s BCE the Seleucid despot Antiochus IV decided to 
overthrow the Temple cult and enforce all-out hellenization of the place. This sparked a 
successful theocratic revolution that established the Hasmonean dynasty in which the 
king was also the High Priest. Thus the legacy of ancient Judaism for us includes the 
invention of both the conservative theocracy and the revolutionary theocracy. 
The history of ancient Tibet (Stein, 1972; Norbu and Turnbull, 1972) is similar 
to that of ancient Israel in that since the dawn of recorded history (7th century AD) the 
country was ruled by a monarchy whose kings alternatively promoted Buddhism and 
the competing, older Bon religion; worse, they often meddled into church affairs by 
favoring one Buddhist sect against the others. Then in the 11th century the kingdom fell 
apart through internecine strife and since then no single local ruler was ever able to 
claim sovereignty over the whole country again. For several centuries thereafter the 
country was torn apart by conflict between rival monasteries and sects allied with 
different groups of lay nobility and territorial princes. Then the reformed Buddhist sect 
(Gelug-pa), established in the early 15th century, evolved a hierarchical system of high 
incarnations which peaked at the Dalai Lama, first recognized as supreme ruler of Tibet 
by the Mongol emperors in the late 16th century. Since the 13th century the country had 
fallen under the distant but benevolent oversight first of the Mongols and then of the 
Chinese empire. These powers were happy to leave local affairs entirely in Tibetan 
hands, and so after centuries of anarchy, for about four centuries, until the Chinese 
communist takeover of the 1950’s, Tibet was a theocracy, where the Dalai Lama, as the 
supreme head of the church, exercised whatever governmental functions were needed in 
a traditional society locked away from the rest of the world. 
A remarkably similar development occurred in Outer Mongolia (Bawden, 1968), 
which was converted to Buddhism by the Tibetans in the late 16th century. Here, since 
the beginning of the 17th century, the Buddhist church evolved a system of high 
incarnations which peaked at the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu. This figure, while 
acknowledging a spiritual subordination to the Tibetan “mother church”, in fact 
exercised absolute control over the spiritual and temporal affairs of the Mongols, 
although the country was nominally a province of the Chinese empire. The theocracy 
was overthrown by the Soviet-inspired communist revolution of 1921.  
The development which led to the establishment of the Papal theocracy follows 
the same broad pattern. The three centuries between the fall of the Western Roman 
empire and the granting of sovereign territory to the pope by a Frankish king saw the 
political situation in Rome swinging widely as Italy passed from one foreign 
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domination to the other, not always friendly to the Papacy. So when the opportunity for 
independent political sovereignty materialized in the 8th century the pope gladly seized 
it and never released it again until the kingdom of Italy took over the city in 1870. 
 
Revolutionary theocracies 
Addressing the Protestant theocracies involves turning from conservation to 
revolution. A string of dissident groups tried to break away from the grip of the 
established church since the Middle Ages and then on through the Reformation and 
beyond, and to establish a “republic of the saints” where religion and worldly politics 
would be one. The list includes the Savonarola dictatorship in Florence, the Taborites in 
Bohemia, the Anabaptist “kingdom” of Muenster, Geneva under Calvin, the English 
Puritans, the Mormons in 19th century America, and many more; most of them, 
especially the early attempts, were wiped out. For illustration we will pick two 
examples: the Anabaptists and the Mormons. 
The key to the Anabaptist story is the millenarian belief (Bax, 1970; Lewy, 
1974): the expectation that the Second Coming of the Lord was imminent and therefore 
the true Christians should ready themselves to the inception of His earthly kingdom. 
Persecuted in Holland and Northern Germany, they flocked to the city of Muenster 
where a group led by a prophet had managed to secure control of the city government in 
early 1534. As ordinary citizens fled and immigration swelled the numbers of true 
believers, the theocracy turned more and more extreme until, after a long siege and 
appalling suffering, it fell to the army of the Lutheran prince-bishop of Saxony in June 
1935. Clearly, the “bad state” for them would have been truly catastrophic: the collapse 
of a unique opportunity to reap the rewards awaiting the saints at the upcoming end of 
time.  With the advantage of hindsight, we could say that their chances of survival as an 
independent “kingdom” were nonexistent, thus disproving the predictions of our model, 
but apparently they did not see the situation that way. In the turbulent political and 
religious conditions of Germany in those times, initially it was not at all clear that the 
bishop might not agree to give up control of the city and let the Anabaptists alone; 
moreover, hopes of an “international revolution of the saints” that might spread to other 
cities ran high at the beginning. But even when these two bets turned out to be a 
delusion and the saints were left alone to confront hugely superior military forces, they 
took it as evidence that the final clash of good and evil was drawing near and therefore 
the Lord could at any time come to the rescue of His chosen people. Therefore buying 
protection or survival from a secular ruler would have proven disproportionately costly, 
in their view, compared to holding fast to their theocracy to the end.  
 21
The Mormons trekked to a distant no-man’s land to the West in 1847 to break 
free from harassment and hostility in their native homeland in upstate New York. They 
thought they were rehearsing the Exodus to the Promised Land, properly led by the self-
appointed successors to their first prophet. These “saints” ran the Mormon society of 
Utah until the church had to surrender to American pressure in the 1890’s. In the 1840’s 
and for some time afterwards, the place was isolated enough that there was little to fear 
from the “gentile” government faraway in Washington; so buying protection and 
compromising on the standards of public religious behavior was clearly inferior to the 
theocratic regime. Things began to change toward the end of the century as 
communications, civilian settlement and military control increasingly covered the West, 
until in the 1890’s a compromise on the conditions for statehood became inevitable.  
These groups reacted to the demise of theocracy in different ways. The Mormon 
church became a powerful state-based pressure group within the federal framework of 
the American constitution, after giving up on some nonnegotiable issues such as 
polygamy. The Mennonites, the Hutterites, the Amish, and other groups heir to the 
Anabaptists retreated into mini-theocracies on a local community scale, negotiating 
their relationship with the government and exploiting the margins of freedom allowed 
by usually benevolent, absent “rulers” such as the American and Canadian 
governments. So as predicted by our model, theocracy died but rose again when, 
relative to the group’s goals and norms, the bad state was very unlikely, whereas it died 
for good when the bad state was very likely. 
 
Islamic theocracies 
The history of Islam (Lapidus, 1988; Berkey, 2003) offers a mixed picture that 
includes a variant of the conservative type of theocracy – the Caliphate, a number of 
revolutionary theocracies, and a whole range of secular regimes beholden to the 
religion. These differences criss-cross the sectarian differences within Islam: among the 
revolutionary regimes the Iranians are Shi’ite, the Taleban of Afghanistan and the 
Mahdi of the Sudan in the 1880’s are Sunni, the Assassins of the 12th century were a 
splinter group from mainline Shi’a (the Ismaili Nizari); likewise, in past centuries there 
were both Sunni and Shi’a Caliphates ruling over different parts of the Muslim world; 
and the “secular” regimes born of jihad range from Saudi Arabia to Palestine’s Hamas. 
The key to understanding the peculiar institution of the Caliphate is the Koranic 
Law, or shari’a. Unlike any other worldly ruler, the Caliph is supposed to be there to 
protect and promote the umma, the universal Muslim community, and as far as domestic 
policies are concerned, this protection boils down to the enforcing of the Law, whose 
administration is properly entrusted to a religious class – the ulemas. To gain 
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perspective, it is useful to contrast the Muslim Caliphate with a superficially similar 
political institution: the Byzantine empire (Runciman, 1977). In the tradition of the first 
Christian Roman emperor Constantine, as theorized by church apologists, the Byzantine 
monarch always styled himself as the protector of the Christian empire, or the vicarious 
representative of God on earth, and was so anointed and upheld by the church. True to 
the linguistic roots of the word, they called the empire a theocracy, and this label, 
confusingly, is still sometimes used by modern historians. But law-making, law-
enforcement, and the court system were completely secular and based on the tradition of 
Roman law, as were the officials running the legal machinery. Consequently, the final 
fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans did not involve the end of the Orthodox church, 
at least not in Greece. 
In the Muslim world the institution of the Caliphate soon became entangled with 
the issue of the proper line of succession to the Prophet – a constant source of sectarian 
dispute and schism. But even when power fell into the hands of foreign invaders like the 
Ottomans, who could lay no claims to legitimate succession, they styled themselves as 
protectors of the faith, so that the collapse of the empire in 1918 marked the end of an 
era – as Osama Bin Laden reminded the world after 9/11. Only with the greatest 
difficulty could the Ottomans take a few sections of the law out of shari’a and into civil 
law. 
When the institutional protector of the faith fails or wanes, the fall-back option is 
jihad, or the holy war. While this was often used against infidels at the frontiers of the 
umma or as a weapon of anti-colonial struggle (Dale, 1988), time and again it has been 
called on against lapsed or corrupt Muslim groups or rulers, and here enters the 
revolutionary theocracy. Jihad has been used in this way since the Middle Ages, for 
example by the Assassins (Lewis, 1967), and then by charismatic, prophetic figures like 
the Mahdi of Sudan (Lewy, 1974, ch. 8) and those of several parts of sub-Saharan West 
Africa in the 19th century. The Saudis, allied with the rigorist Wahabi sect, built up their 
Arabian kingdom through jihad from the 18th to the early 20th century; they did not 
build a full-fledged theocracy because, in the absence of a Mahdi or prophet, the 
traditional organization of Sunni Islam, unlike that of other sects, lacks the hierarchical 
structure required to fully replace the secular ruler. This disability of the Sunnis has 
rapidly been overcome in the 20th century as the intrusion of Western rule and the rise to 
power of secular, nationalist regimes in the Muslim world sparked the rise and spread of 
fundamentalist Islamic revolutionary organizations patterned after Western political 
parties, from Egypt to Afghanistan, from Iraq to Somalia, from Algeria to Palestine, 
from Lebanon to Sudan. 
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How does this picture fit with our model? In pre-modern and early modern 
Islamic societies (except perhaps at their fringes), despite the ups and downs of 
successive regimes, a terminal threat to the very survival of the religion was never felt 
to be a serious possibility – hence the half-way theocracy of the Caliphate (or the Saudi 
regime) in which a secular ruler is wedded to a religious class in charge of the law. This 
changed in the 20th century with the arrival of Western imperialism and the score of 
Westernized, “apostate” regimes that arose in its wake. Now abolition of shari’a law 
and suppression of the very heart of the religion became a real, impending threat. Where 
the “heathen” ruler was obviously too bad and too strong to be challenged, theocracy 
was hopeless and the Muslims turned into a locally powerful pressure group and bought 
protection from the non-Islamic state, as in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia 
and the Muslim enclaves in the Balkans. But in Western and Southern Asia, the 
heartland of Islam, the roots and traditions were thought to be strong enough that the 
“bad state” was not overwhelmingly likely to materialize – a theocratic revolution was, 
and still is, perceived to have real chances of success. So, the rise of revolutionary 
Islamic theocracy is simply part of a general tendency toward radicalization as a 
reaction to perceived failure that has characterized Islamist politics in the past several 
decades (Ferrero, 2005). 
 
 
8. Some extensions to nonreligious groups 
 
This paper has focused on the make-or-buy choice facing a powerful religious 
organization in its dealings with the government. But there is nothing specifically 
religious in such a choice problem, so with suitable interpretation our framework can be 
extended to other groups as well. While a full analysis of this extension is beyond the 
scope of this paper, we will now sketch out two examples to show the power of the 
principal-agent approach to political regimes: organized labor and the military. 
 
Socialism 
The history of the last 150 years has witnessed a wide variety of strategies and 
outcomes of labor politics, which all fall within the classic dilemma between revolution 
and reform (Ferrero, 2004b). Consider a labor party (a socialist party) which is powerful 
enough to contemplate the takeover of the government as a real possibility. Like our 
church, the party has two options: run the government in-house, by entrusting it to a 
party official, or contract it out to an outsider. Under the first option, the socialist party 
retains full information but incurs a potential loss from either administrative 
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inefficiency or official corruption (or both). Under the second option, the party incurs a 
partial loss of information and control but enjoys the advantages of superior skills and 
keeps its hands free to pick the best agent. Thus in this interpretation, socialist 
revolution, or a communist regime, corresponds to theocracy and pro-labor reform, or 
social-democracy, corresponds to secular government. Socialist parties made different 
choices in different countries at different times. What can explain the diversity? 
If our model has merit, the answer must lie in the combination of parameters that 
yields the maximum comparative advantage of theocracy (here, of revolution): a bad 
state which is disastrously bad but not very likely to occur. Therefore, socialist 
revolution was the preferred option when the class struggle was so extreme that defeat 
would mean that the labor organization and all its achievements would be wiped out: 
the threat was indeed a terminal one; however, labor was strong enough that such a total 
defeat was relatively unlikely. On the other hand, when the terminal threat was real and 
also likely (a low P) because labor was weak, then a safer course was to “duck and 
cover” and try to buy protection by compromising and making alliances. By contrast, 
when the bad state was not so disastrously bad (θL relatively high) – labor did not face 
the prospect of political extinction even in the worst circumstances – and anyway labor 
was strong enough to hope for better outcomes, then the result was social-democracy 
and reform. The fact that the realization of the random variable θ was bounded from 
below could be due to the existence of “fair” rules of the game, such as franchise 
extension, party competition and democracy, that reassured the socialist party3. 
An interesting follow-up to our interpretation of socialist revolution as a 
principal-agent problem arises in the mature stage of communist regimes. As is well 
known, despite many attempts at reform and experiments with “market socialism”, and 
against the advice of countless pundits and a whole section of the Western economics 
profession, communist regimes never turned “secular” and never entrusted the key 
positions of government to non-party officials, even when it was obviously beneficial to 
efficiency to do so. As a long-time expert witness on the matter, Mao Zedong, famously 
said, between “red” and “expert”, “red” must always take priority. Most communist 
regimes went on unreformed to the brink of the Great Collapse of 1989-91. The handful 
of regimes that survived the collapse have reformed everything in the economy but 
never secularized. How can we account for this glaring inability, or unwillingness, of 
the communists to contract government out? 
                                               
3 An interesting observation is that in many, though not all, cases the guardian of the rules turned out to 
be a constitutional monarchy, where, as in northern Europe, the royalty was not unduly slanted toward the 
propertied classes. 
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A possible line of answer emphasizes public ownership of the key industries, 
which for good reasons became inseparably intertwined with the functioning of 
communist regimes (Ferrero, 2001, 2004a). If a non-party official plays foul and starts 
privatizing firms on market principles, the threat to communist party power is really 
deadly – even though such an event was perceived (perhaps wrongly) as unlikely. This 
contrasts with the so-called “spontaneous privatization” in the Soviet Union and 
elsewhere, which was serving the interests of the key groups that controlled the state-
owned enterprises, as well as the carefully controlled, piecemeal, selective privatization 
now being carried out by Chinese party officials. 
So in the labor case, unlike the religion case, the takeover of state power put in 
place a particular institution that made the expected cost of any reversal to “secular” 
government prohibitively high for the ruling party. 
 
Military dictatorships 
When the military has sufficient power in a country to contemplate government 
takeover, and is not restrained by other considerations, it too faces the choice between 
exercising government directly and contracting it out to civilians. Here military 
dictatorship corresponds to theocracy and civilian government to secular government. 
Unlike the communists, the generals seem to face no difficulty in contracting out 
to civilian rule: such handovers are fairly common. The reason is simple: unlike 
communist regimes, military regimes do not build any special institution, such as state 
ownership, to which their fortunes become tied up. A powerful, general proxy for the 
objective that military regimes maximize is the size of the defense budget (Wintrobe, 
1998). This objective is not a regime-specific institution and therefore it poses no 
constraints on transition between regimes. 
Unlike theocracies, military dictatorships are not long-lasting regimes: they 
seem to wear out with time and hand power over to civilian regimes. The revolving 
Latin American dictatorships of he 20th century are a case in point. This observation is 
easy to accommodate within our make-or-buy framework. The military resort to direct 
rule in polarized societies where hostility to them is very strong, threatening their 
annihilation, yet they are strong enough that such threat is unlikely to materialize. But 
by exercising direct rule and overt repression, the military soften the threat itself so that 
the necessity to continue direct rule loses force and the inefficiencies of repressive 
government become prominent, making it wise and profitable to hand power over to 
civilians. In turn, civilian government makes room for a rekindling of popular feelings 
against the military who are in fact keeping control of things behind the wings, and the 
cycle goes on. Only a settled, developed democracy where the military are firmly under 
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political control but at the same time are guaranteed a place under the sun can break the 





This paper has addressed theocracy as a regime in which a clergy conducts 
political government directly in preference to an alternative arrangement where it 
negotiates a division of labor and rents with a secular ruler. Modeling these two 
alternatives as a full-information and a hidden-information contract, respectively, of 
principal-agent theory allows us to ask for which combination of environmental 
parameters the comparative advantage of theocracy over secular government is greatest. 
We find that this advantage is greatest when the bad state of the world, if it occurs, is 
disastrously bad, but the probability of its occurrence is low though not negligible. In 
such an environment, therefore, theocracies are most likely to arise and persist. A look 
at the historical evidence suggests that this theoretical result helps to account for the 
broad traits of a range of observed theocracies, from ancient Israel through the 
Anabaptists to contemporary Islamist radicalism. Finally, we have suggested the 
possibility for our model to be applied to completely different groups that also face a 
make-or-buy choice with respect to the government, such as socialist parties and 
military elites. Both the testing on historical theocracies and the extension to 





Derivation of the optimal contract with hidden information 
 
Recall problem (5). First, we can ignore constraint (ii) because when constraints 
(i) and (iii) are satisfied it will be satisfied as well, as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) °≥−>−≥− Uecwecwecw LLLHLLHHH θθθ ,,,  
 
The first inequality is due to constraint (iii) while the last is due to constraint (i). 
The strict inequality in the middle is due to our assumption (equation (2)) that θc  <0 for 
all e. It follows that constraint (ii) will hold with strict inequality, i.e. the agent will earn 
a surplus in state θH.  
Secondly, we will proceed to solve the problem ignoring constraint (iv) and later 
show that any solution to problem (5) that ignores constraint (iv) will also satisfy it. 
Therefore by dropping constraints (ii) and (iv) problem (5) reduces to the following: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
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                                       (A1) 
 
Letting (λ, µ) ≥0 be the multipliers on constraints (i) and (iii) respectively, and 
assuming (wL, wH) >0, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem can be written: 
 
0=+− µP                               (A2.1) 
( ) 01 =−+−− µλP                                                                               (A2.2) 









ecebP θµ                                                      (A2.3) 


















θ Uecw LLL                                                           (A2.5) 




0  if   0
0
,, µθθ HLLHHH ecwecw                                        (A2.6) 
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Conditions (A2.1) and (A2.2) together imply that µ=P >0 and λ =1. Hence, both 
conditions (A2.5) and (A2.6) hold with equality, i.e. both constraints (i) and (iii) must 
bind at an optimal solution. 
Because of our assumptions that b’(0) >0 and that ec  =0 for e =0 (equ. (2)), 
conditions (A2.3) and (A2.4) cannot hold at e =0. Hence, both eL and eH are strictly 
positive at an optimal solution, which implies that both (A2.3) and (A2.4) hold with 
equality. Then, substituting µ =P and λ =1 into these conditions yields equations (6a) 
and (6b) in the text, which characterize the optimal values of eH and eL. Then, wL and 
wH are determined by constraints (i) and (iii), which hold with equality at the solution.  
We now show that constraint (iv) is also satisfied at the optimal solution. The 
binding constraint (iii) yields  
 
( ) ( )HLHHLH ececww θθ ,, −=−  
 
Since in the solution eH > eL, the assumption that θec  <0 (equ. (2)) implies 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LLLHHLHH ecececec θθθθ ,,,, −<−  
 
These two together yield constraint (iv) as a strict inequality. 
The second-order conditions for this problem are cumbersome but 
straightforward and will not be reported. 
Finally, implicit differentiation of equation (6b) in the text yields: 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]











−−−′=                 (A3) 
 
Since the denominator is required to be negative by the second-order conditions, 
this derivative is negative.  
 
Effects of parameter changes 
 
We begin with the two expected benefit functions separately. For EBN, 
substituting constraints (i) and (iii) into the objective function (5) at the optimal solution 
yields: 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ][ ]








,ˆˆP-1            
,ˆ,ˆ,
                                 (A4) 
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whose partial derivatives with respect to P and θL are, respectively: 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]HLLLLLLHHH ecececebeceb θθθθ ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆˆ, −−−−− ∗∗                      (A5) 
 
( ) 0,ˆ >− LLec θθ                                                                                              (A6) 
 
Where (A5) is equal to zero EBN reaches a minimum with respect to P, since, 
given the sign of (A3): 
 











N θ                                                         (A7) 
 
EBO is given by substitution of the constraint into the objective function (3) at 
the optimal solution: 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] KUecebPecebPEB LLLHHHO −°−−−+−= ∗∗∗∗ θθ ,1,                     (A8) 
 
whose partial derivatives with respect to P and θL are, respectively: 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]LLLHHH ecebeceb θθ ,, ∗∗∗∗ −−−                                                             (A9) 
 
which is a positive constant, and 
 
( ) ( ) 0,1 >−− ∗ LLecP θθ                                                                                    (A10) 
 
Maximizing benefits difference between regimes 
 
Since EBO – EBN, equation (7) in the text, is simply (A8) – (A4), its first 
derivatives are the difference of the first derivatives of the latter expressions. Therefore, 
the first-order conditions for a maximum of (7), i.e. equations (8a) and (8b) in the text, 
are the differences (A9) – (A5) and (A10) – (A6), respectively, set equal to zero.  
The second-order conditions for the maximization problem (7) are: 
 











NO θ                                         (A11.1) 
 30
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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where  
















                              (A11.4) 
 
Note that (A11.4) can have any sign, depending on whether a change in θL has a 
greater effect on total or on marginal effort cost. The derivatives LL ded θˆ  and 
LL dde θ∗  in (A11.2), not reported here, can be calculated by implicit differentiation of 
equations (6b) and (4b) in the text, respectively: they measure change in effort in each 
model as θL changes, fulfilling the respective FOCs throughout. Using the second-order 
conditions for problem (5) (not reported), it can be shown that they are both positive 
and, assuming (neutrally) all third-order partials equal to zero, that LL ded θˆ  > 
LL dde θ∗  >0. 
The first-order conditions for problem (7) implicitly define two functions P(θL): 
one, ( )LP θ , is the locus of all (P, θL) pairs at which (8a) holds; the other, ( )LP θ∗ , is the 
locus of all (P, θL) pairs at which (8b) holds. By implicit differentiation we can calculate 
the slopes of these functions as follows: 
 
( ) ( )





























                                                            (A12) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )







































−=   
(A13) 
 
The denominator of (A12) is (A11.1) and the numerator of (A13) is (A11.2). 
Therefore the sign of these derivatives is the same as the sign of (A11.4), which is the 
numerator of (A12) and the denominator of (A13): LdPd θ and LddP θ∗  will thus 
have the same sign. Since (A11.4) cannot be signed without further restrictions, (A12) 
and (A13) can either be both positive or both negative. 
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Taking the difference (A12) – (A13) and cross-multiplying one finds the second-
order condition (A11.3). For the latter to hold, it can be readily checked that when 
(A11.4) >0, i.e. (A12) and (A13) are both positive, it must be LddP θ∗  > LdPd θ , 
whereas when (A11.4) <0, i.e. (A12) and (A13) are both negative, it must be LddP θ∗  
< LdPd θ . Thus in the neighborhood of the optimum ( )LP θ∗  must always be steeper 
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